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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Grover Rye, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional
guilty plea to failure to register as a sex offender.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Rye is a registered sex offender.

(R., p.5; PSI, p.3.) As of March 11,

2013, Rye's registered place of residence was the Light House Rescue Mission
("the Lighthouse") in Nampa, Idaho.

(Id.)

On March 15, 2013, staff at the

Lighthouse informed law enforcement that "Rye had left [their] facility on 3/11/13
and had not returned." (Id.) Law enforcement attempted to locate Rye but were
unable to do so until April 1, 2013, when Rye was "arrested for an offense." (Id.)
During an interview with law enforcement, Rye admitted that, after he left the
Lighthouse, he went to Nevada for a few days, then returned to Idaho and
stayed with friends in Canyon and Owyhee Counties.

(PSI, p.3.)

Rye also

admitted he never updated his registration information after he left the
Lighthouse. (Id.)
The state charged Rye with failure to register as a sex offender, in
violation of I.C. §§ 18-8304, 18-8307, 18-8308, 18-8309 and 18-8311.
pp.18-19.) Specifically, the Information alleged that Rye,
th

on or about the 11 day of March, 2013, in the County of Canyon,
State of Idaho, after establishing residence in Canyon County, has
failed to update his registration information within two working days
as required by statute, after having been convicted of the crime of
Sexual Batter[y] On A Minor Child, pursuant to Idaho Code Section
18-1508A.
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(R.,

(R., p.19.)

The state also filed an Information Part 11, alleging Rye was a

persistent violator. (R., pp.24-25.)
Before trial, the parties asked the district court to resolve an issue of
statutory interpretation, to wit: Whether Rye - who was subject to sex offender
registration and had registered the Lighthouse as his place of residence - was
subject to the requirement of I.C. § 18-8309(1) that he update his registration
information within two working days of leaving the Lighthouse, or whether he had
seven days to do so, as contemplated by I.C. § 18-8308(4). (Tr., p.5, L.9 - p.6,
L.6.) Following a hearing on the issue, the district court determined that Rye was
subject to the two-day registration requirement of I.C. § 18-8309(1). (R., pp.3738; Tr., p.23, L.22 - p.27, L.12.) Specifically, the court ruled:
[U]nder [I. C.] § 18-8309 when an individual registers but then
leaves his/her registered address, the offender shall appear within
two (2) working days to notify the sheriff. Thus, upon leaving the
Lighthouse, the Defendant would have had two (2) days to inform
the Canyon County Sheriff's Office he was no longer living at the
Lighthouse and give them an address or location where he was
staying. If the Defendant did not have an address to go to, under
[I.C.] § 18-8308(4), the Defendant must go to the sheriff every
seven days to check in. The Court finds an individual cannot avoid
[the] registration requirement just because they are homeless.
Thus, the statute is clear and Defendant did have an obligation to
update his registration.
(R., p.37.)
Following the district court's ruling, Rye entered a conditional guilty plea to
failure to register as a sex offender, reserving the right on appeal to challenge
the district court's interpretation of the relevant statutes; in exchange, the state
dismissed

the

persistent violator enhancement and

agreed

to

cap

its

recommendation as to the determinate portion of Rye's sentence at one and

2

one-half years. (R., pp.39-51, 59; Tr., p.32, L.13 - p.49, L.18.) In recognition
that Rye "probably did not intend to break the law in this particular case," the
district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one and one-half
years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Rye on probation for a
period of three years.

(R., pp.60-62; Tr., p.67, L.1 - p.68, L.16.)

appealed. (R., pp.63-65.)
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Rye timely

ISSUE
Rye states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court misinterpret Idaho Code § 18-8309 as
requiring Mr. Rye to notify the county sheriff within two days of
leaving his residence, even though Mr. Rye had become homeless
and/or left the State?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Rye failed to show error in the district court's interpretation of I.C. § 188309(1) as requiring Rye to update his registration information within two days of
leaving his last registered address?
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ARGUMENT
Rye Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Interpretation Of
I.C. § 18-8309(1) As Requiring Him To Update His Registration Information
Within Two Days Of Leaving His Last Registered Address
A.

Introduction
"Mindful of the plain language of the relevant statutes," Rye argues "the

district court erroneously concluded that, pursuant to l.C. § 18-8309, he was
required to notify the Canyon County Sheriff's office that he was no longer living
at the Lighthouse, within two days of leaving." (Appellant's brief, p.6.)
argument fails.

Rye's

The plain language of I.C. § 18-8309(1) supports the district

court's conclusion that Rye was required to update his registration information
within two days of leaving the Lighthouse, which was Rye's last registered
address.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review.

State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 561, 286

P.3d 537, 539 (2012).

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded Rye Was Subject To The Two-Day
Registration Requirement Of I.C. § 18-8309(1)
"The interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the

statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and
the statute must be construed as a whole."' Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (quoting State v.
Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). '"If the statute is not
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ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as
written."'

kl

Idaho Code § 18-8309 governs the duty of sex offenders to update their
registration information and provides, in relevant part:
(1) If an offender subject to registration changes his or her
name, street address or actual address, employment or student
status, the offender shall appear in person within two (2) working
days after the change at the office of the sheriff of the county
where the offender is required to register and notify the sheriff of all
changes in the information required for that offender in the sex
offender registry. . . . Within three (3) working days after receipt of
the notice, the sheriff shall notify the department of the changed
information and the department shall notify all other counties and
jurisdictions in which the offender is required to register. An
offender satisfies the notification requirements set forth in this
subsection if he or she appears in another jurisdiction in which
registration is required and notifies that jurisdiction of the changed
information.
I.C. § 18-8309(1 ). As found by the district court, the language of this statute is
unambiguous and plainly requires a sex offender who changes his or her
address to notify the county sheriff within two working days of the change.
Because it is undisputed that "Rye was subject to registration, had a residence,
and then left his residence" (Appellant's brief, p.7), the district court correctly
concluded Rye was required under I.C. § 18-8309(1) to update his registration
information within two days of leaving his last registered address.
Rye does not seriously contend otherwise.

Instead he adopts his trial

counsel's argument that, because Rye allegedly had no permanent residence
after leaving the Lighthouse, his duty to register "should fall under the
requirements under 18-8308(4), that he report in person ... once every seven

6

days with the sheriff." (Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.5; see also Appellant's brief,
pp.7-8.) Rye's argument is without merit.
Idaho Code§ 18-8308(4) states:
(4) A sexual offender who does not provide a physical
residence address at the time of registration shall report, in person,
once every seven (7) days to the sheriff of the county in which he
resides. Each time the offender reports to the sheriff, he shall
complete a form provided by the department that includes the
offender's name, date of birth, social security number and a
detailed description of the location where he is residing. The sheriff
shall visit the described location at least once each month to verify
the location of the offender.
I.C. § 18-8308(4). Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, the seven-day
reporting requirement applies only to sexual offenders who do not provide a
physical residence address at the time of registration.
In this case, it is undisputed that Rye had registered the Lighthouse's
address as his physical residence. 1

Because Rye had registered a physical

residence address, he was required by the plain language of I.C. § 18-8309(1) to
notify the county sheriff within two days of leaving that address that he no longer
resided there. As found by the district court, if, at that time, Rye did not have a
new physical address to report, the requirements of I.C. § 18-8308(4) would
have been triggered and he would thereafter have been required to report to the
sheriff every seven days and provide a detailed description of the location where
he was residing. (See R., p.37 ("If the Defendant did not have an address to go
to, under [I.C.] § 18-8308(4), the Defendant must go to the sheriff every seven

For purposes of the sex offender registration statutes, a "residence" is defined
as "the offender's present place of abode." I.C. § 18-8303(15).
1

7

days to check in."); Tr., p.25, L.25 - p.26, L.9 (Rye was required to notify the
sheriff within two days of leaving his registered address and "if at that time [he]
did not have a physical address, then under subsection 18-8308(4), the sheriff
would have instructed [him] to report every seven days.").)
The plain and unambiguous language of I.C. § 18-8309(1) supports the
district court's determination that Rye was required to update his registration
information within two days of leaving his last registered address. Rye has failed
to show any basis for reversal.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Rye's conviction and
sentence.
DATED this 15th day of October, 2014.

ORI A FLEM~G
Deputy Attorne~I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15th day of October, 2014, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

Deputy Attorney Gen al
LAF/pm

9

